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Zewadski: Delinquency and Denied Rights in Florida's Juvenile Court System
FLORIDA'S JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM

DELINQUENCY AND DENIED RIGHTS IN FLORIDA'S
JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
Juvenile court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.
-In re Gault'
Six months after the Gault decision, 2 a survey of procedural practices
in delinquency cases before Florida's juvenile courts showed uniformity in
several areas of fundamental rights but disclosed radical variance in others.
Replies from over two-thirds of the juvenile courts in Florida3 revealed that
serious lack of compliance with current law existed in many jurisdictions and
that, where certain procedural rights are currently left to judicial discretion,
clear guidelines are needed to assure full, fair, and equal consideration of
alleged offenses throughout the state, consistent with the traditional philosophy of the juvenile court system and in keeping with the reinterpretation of
4
it by the recent Gault case.
In spite of its limitations,5 the survey presents a reasonably representative
picture of the procedural and dispositional aspects of Florida's juvenile court
1. In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1438-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gault].
2. Id.
3. Of the sixty-seven juvenile courts in Florida (one in each county), forty-eight responded to the survey, 71.6% of the total. Replies were received from counties representing
66.1%, or 3,932,000 persons, of the total population of 5,941,000. Provisional Estimates of
the Population of Florida, by Counties: July 1, 1966, table 2.162. FLORIDA STATISTICAL
ABSTRAcr 1967 (A. Biscoe, E. Jones, D. Moody ed. 1967). Figures derived from the survey
are not weighted by population since each county, however small, represents an independent
jurisdiction and an integral judicial policy.
The cooperation of the many juvenile judges and juvenile court counselors was invaluable and is greatly appreciated. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the comments of any participant.
4. See Comment, Application of Gault, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 120 (1967), in which this
author suggests that in view of the stigma and substantial deprivation of liberty threatened
by an adjudication of delinquency, the fundamental rights secured to the juvenile must be
redefined. See also Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal,53 VA. L. Rav. 1700, 1708 (1967).
The 1967 legislature enacted a statute allowing classification as a "child in need of
supervision" before an adjudication of delinquency, where no law has been broken. FLA.
STAT. §39.01 (12) (1967). The discussion here of the juvenile's rights in an adjudication of
delinquency must also apply in the initial determination of "a child in need of supervision"
status since, although there is no immediate threat of being sent to a state training school
at that time, the child's liberty may be limited by the supervision. Also, he is placed
in jeopardy of being branded a delinquent upon his second appearance by being labeled
a "child in need of supervision" without procedural fairness in his first encounter with the
court. If all procedural rights and privileges are accorded to the juvenile when he is first
determined to be a "child in need of supervision," the admirable purpose of this legislationto remove the stigma of being adjudged a delinquent where no law is violated - will have
been served without infringing his liberty. A contrary view is considered in Dorsen &
Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMmY L.Q., Dec. 1967, at 1, 7-8.
5. The survey had some methodological difficulties that could not be eliminated. For
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system. Answers made by the courts were particularly interesting when they
were in conflict with the provisions of Gault and state statutes as "admissions
against interest." Occasional deviations from reported practices seem more
likely in those areas where no definitive and mandatory standards have been
set.
COMPLIANCE WITH RIGHTS AFFIRMED BY

Gault REGARDING

THE

ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY

Of those aspects of the juvenile court procedure included in the survey,
the greatest uniformity, as might have been expected, was in those areas
where the Gault decision most clearly defined constitutional requirements:
notice, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation and cross-examination.
Notice of Chargesand Allegations
Gault redefined the due process requirements of notice to mean adequate
notice of charges or factual allegations stated with sufficient particularity to
permit preparation of a proper defense in advance of hearing. 6 It was held
that such notice must be in writing and "be given at the earliest practicable
time ...sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation [of a
defense]."' 7 Failure to object to inadequate notice is not a waiver of this right,
especially when there is no representation by counsel or notice of right to
counsel.8 Florida statutes had already required that the person who takes the
child into custody notify the parents or legal custodian "at the earliest practicable time," that the petition "clearly, fairly and concisely" state facts or
charges to give adequate notice,1° and that the summons recite the "substance"
of the petition."'
Forty-three of the forty-eight courts responding stated that one of the
functions of intake (the first contact between the court and the juvenile) is
to "make known the substance of the complaint to the juvenile, his parents,
or his counsel."' 1 2 The petition containing charges is often attached to the
example, although answers were sought only about delinquency cases, it was evident that
traffic, neglect, dependency, and custody cases were often included. Errors in approximating
percentages were unavoidable without extensive review of court records. Some replies were
prepared by juvenile court counselors whose answers might have differed from those of
the judges.

6. Gault at 1446.
7. Id. For preparation of a defense, both facts and law must be stated with specificity.
See Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 4, at 13-14.
8. Id. at 1447 n.54.
9. FLA. STAT. §39.03 (3) (1967).
10. FLA. STAT. §39.05 (4) (1967).
11. FLA. STAT. §39.06(2) (1967).
12. Except as noted, failure to respond to a given question is unexplained and here,
for example, does not necessarily indicate that proper notice is not made "at the earliest
practicable time." Such a conclusion would be justified only where a negative answer was
requested; here none was asked for by the survey.
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summons itself. The method of giving notice is of some interest: forty courts
give notice both orally and in writing,1 3 while two others give written notice.
The six remaining courts give only oral notice despite Gault's requirement of
notice in writing. The statute provides that the petition be in writing1 4 and,
by implication, it requires that the summons, which recites "briefly the substance of the petition,"15 be in writing. Written notice is customary in all
other types of judicial proceedings and would insure adequate and unhurried
examination of the allegations and, where the facts are contested, thorough
preparation of a defense. Under the statute, only the child's optional answer
may be either oral or in writing.' 6
Right to Counsel (IncludingFree Counsel when Indigent)
In 1966, a Florida district court held that failure to notify the child and
his parents of their rights to counsel did not constitute a denial- of due
process. 7 This ruling is inconsistent with Gault, which dearly upheld on a
due process basis the right to counsel, including appointed counsel for indigents. s Forty-six courts advise both the parents and child of this right at
some point in the proceedings, while the remaining two courts advise only
the parents. There is disagreement as to when the notice of right to counsel
should be given. Twenty-eight courts advise parties at intake, twenty at the
time of notice to appear, and twenty-nine at the beginning of the hearing.19
Where notice of the right is not given until the beginning of the hearing and
counsel is then requested, the hearing should be postponed until counsel can
be secured. Thus, earlier notification would seem conducive to a speedy
hearing. Despite the ease with which earlier notification can be given, ten
of the forty-eight courts responding advise only at the time of hearing; all
20
ten are in counties with a population of fewer than fifty thousand persons.
13. E.g., in one county the petition is read at the time of service. One of the courts
giving both kinds of notice, however, "initially" gives only oral notice and permits the child

and parent to "read if they want."
14. FLA. STAT. §39.05 (2) (1967).
15. FLA.STAT. §39.06 (2) (1967).
16.

FLA. STAT. §39.07 (1967).

17. In re T.W.P., 184 So. 2d 507 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
18. Gault at 1451; Steinhauer v. State, 206 So. 2d 25 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
19. Multiple answers from individual courts account for the total being higher than
the forty-eight responding. Eight of the courts, principally the large counties, noted they

give notice at all three points. Thirteen others give notice twice. Since the right to have
competent counsel is the "keystone of the whole system of guarantees that a minimum
system of procedural justice requires," REPORT oF THE PRasmENT's COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A

FREE

SocIEry

at 87 (1967) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CRIME COMM'N REPORT], such multiple notification is in keeping with full implementation of procedural protections for the alleged
offender.
20. Often those counties with larger caseloads were observed to have developed more

refined procedures. In spite of this disagreement about when notice of right to counsel is
given, all but tnvo of those answering said they give notice of free counsel at the same
time as the notice of the right to have counsel.
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Thirty-two courts indicated that lawyers appear as retained counsel in
"one-to-five per cent" of petitioned delinquency cases.2 1 On the other hand,
when asked about the use of assigned counsel for indigents, fourteen said,
"none," twenty reported, "one-to-five per cent," and four noted, "higher
frequency."22 Therefore, half a year after Gault, the use of assigned counsel
was only gradually becoming accepted. Difficulty was reported in finding a
supply of assigned counsel. Seventeen courts call on the services of the public
defender, at least in felony cases, and thirty-three call on members of the
local bar. A few courts noted that no funds had been allocated or that no
source of counsel had yet been determined since there had been no request
for counsel.
In a related area, the courts were asked if they would appoint a guardian
ad litem when parents allege that their child is incorrigible. Despite the
obvious conflict of interest between the parents and child in such a case and
the difficulty of an intelligent waiver of counsel by the child alone, thirtyseven courts said either that no guardian ad litem had ever been appointed
or that they would never make such an appointment. Several courts anticipated the necessity for such a procedure, but others maintained that in those
cases the court itself should act as guardian of the child - an approach they
felt would prevent the possible danger of an undesirable conflict between
parent and child.2 3 In such a case, unless parents are represented by counsel,
it seems consistent with due process for the courts to act for the interest of
the child because, unlike the case where a delinquent act is at issue, the court
need not be concerned with the security of the community in addition to the
interests of the child. Where a delinquent act is alleged, and the nonindigent
parents refuse to provide an attorney when the court believes counsel would
be advisable, it may be incumbent on the court to provide a guardian ad
litem merely to insure procedural fairness and effective presentation of the
issues.

24

Right To Remain Silent
Gault restated that the alleged juvenile delinquent must be notified of his
right to remain silent without penalty, - 5 because of potential deprivation of

liberty and the inherent unreliability of a juvenile confession. In so holding,
the Court implicitly struck down the earlier "civil, not criminal" distinction
21. Two counties reported retained lawyers in 6 to 10% of cases; 4 reported none; nine
did not respond; and one gave an erroneous answer.
22. Ten courts did not answer, and the one other reply is the erroneous answer noted
in note 21 supra. For the view that counsel should be appointed as a matter of course

without requiring a choice, see NATIONAL CRIME COMM'N REPORT 85-86.
23. An Alabama case has held appointment of a guardian ad litem necessary for defense against an allegation of incorrigibility. Ex parte State ex. rel. Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17
So. 2d 449 (1949). (In that case, however, there was an allegation of murder and the
juvenile had been represented by both counsel and the guardian ad litem required by
statute.)
24. E.g., where the allegations are serious and complicated but denied by the child.
See OPs. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 068-34 (1968) (resting right to free counsel on the insolvency of
the juvenile, not that of his parents); cf. FLA. STAT. §39.06 (5) (1967).
25.

Gault at 1458.
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on which denial of this fundamental right had been based. The warning of
the right to remain silent is given as "always" by forty-five of the courts
answering and "sometimes" by the two others. 26 Fifteen give the warning at
both intake and the beginning of the hearing. In all, twenty-nine notify the
juvenile of his right to remain silent at intake, twenty-nine at the beginning
of the hearing, and eight at the time of notice to appear.2 7 Larger jurisdictions tend to give the warning at intake and smaller ones at the hearing stage.
Warning at intake is essential, especially where statements at intake may
be admissible in the later adjudication hearing. Thirty-seven courts determine during the intake proceedings whether the child admits or denies the
charges. Correlating the incidence of intake warning with admissibility at the
adjudicatory hearing is very interesting in the light of Gault. Twenty-four
courts warn the juvenile of his right to remain silent at intake and permit
any confessions made then to be admitted at the hearing.28 Ten courts neither
warn nor admit such statements, while six others warn against self-incrimination but do not admit intake confessions at adjudication. All of these courts
protect the juvenile's rights against self-incrimination. However, four courts
of smaller counties report that they do not warn the juvenile at intake and
yet do admit his intake confession in the adjudicatory hearing. 29 The practice clearly fails to provide the Gault safeguards. Moreover, all four courts
report high percentages (eighty to ninety-nine per cent) of intake admissions
of guilt. Not only should the record show affirmatively notification of rights,
lack of duress, and intelligent waiver, but also the admission should be tested
for reliability at the hearing before it becomes determinative. Thus, the
juvenile must be asked to reaffirm or deny his intake admission before the
adjudicatory hearing proceeds further. High percentages of intake admissions (over sixty per cent) were reported by twenty-seven of the thirty-three
courts responding. The same high percentages obtain at the adjudicatory
hearing in nearly as many courts. Another and perhaps better solution to
the problem of intake admissions is to make them privileged and hence
inadmissible in the adjudicatory hearing. 30
26. One other court did not respond to this question. The two courts, which warn of
self-incrimination only "sometimes," violate the requirements of due process defined in
Gault when they fail to give the admonition.
27. Since multiple answers were requested, the total for this point is more than the
number of courts responding. Other answers included "when accused is first interviewed by
counselor," and "at intake by staff, but presumably sooner by police."
28. Several of these responses were qualified by the requirement that such intake confessions later be affirmed at the hearing.
29. One of the four warns against self-incrimination only "sometimes" at the beginning
of the hearing. The other three "always" give notice at the beginning of hearing. But
where an earlier confession made without warning is admissible, the later warning at the
hearing is meaningless since it would not affect the prior admission. The practice clearly
violates due process. See State v. Francois, 197 So. 2d 492 (1967) (the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's conviction and emphasized the timely warning given of
rights and the voluntariness of the confession given while the juvenile was under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court); Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 4, at 39-40.
30. Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53
VA. L. Rrv. 1700, 1714 (1967).
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Some indication of the danger of self-incrimination is apparent from answers to a collateral question: "How do you feel about the maxim 'Confession is good for the soul' in the juvenile court context?" This question was
intended to probe the judge's willingness to accept admissions and his attitude about their desirability. The responses did not indicate that confessions
are greeted with a totally critical attitude: thirty-six of forty-four courts said
they agree with the maxim; 31 two others agreed with reservations. One court
stated, "Rehabilitation must begin with recognition of the crime," and another commented, "I don't believe they [the alleged delinquents] should be
taught to lie or become Philadelphia lawyers- if the adjudication is a monster or an anathema, perhaps steps could be taken to lighten the effects of
the adjudication." While not necessarily in conflict with adequate protections,
such an attitude is implicitly contrary to the full implementation of protections against self-incrimination, especially since an attorney is usually not
present in the juvenile court. Such an approach overlooks the serious threat
of stigma and deprivation of liberty that an adjudication of delinquency entails. The Arizona Supreme Court in Gault had maintained that notification
of the right to silence was unnecessary "because confession is good for the
child as the commencement of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court
process, and he should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and
confidence toward the officials of the juvenile process."3 2 The United States
33
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning:
In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do
not aid in "individualized treatment," as the court below put it, and
that compelling the child to answer questions, without warning or
advice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or
any other good purpose. .

.

. [I]t seems probable that where children

are induced to confess by "parental" urgings on the part of officials
and the confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's
reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse....
Further, authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the
reliability and trustworthiness of "confessions" by children.
It is therefore hoped that confessions may be received with greater
skepticism from an evidentiary standpoint; that procedures, especially earlier
warning of rights, will be developed to insure more fully that the juvenile
will not blindly or wrongly implicate himself, and that it will be recognized
that confessions followed by punishment impair rather than facilitate the
difficult task of rehabilitation. Before these goals are reached, a fundamental
change in attitude will have to occur in many of Florida's juvenile courts
regarding the desirability of confessions.

31.
cinctly:
32.
33.

Several courts replying (at least four) disagreed with the maxim. One said suc"Gibberish."
Gault at 1456.
Id.
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Sworn Testimony, Confrontationand Cross-Examination

Gault held that in the absence of a valid confession, "confrontation and
sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination [are] essential
for a finding of 'delinquency' and an order [of commitment]." 34 In part this
holding indicates that hearsay evidence cannot be the basis for an adjudication
of delinquency carrying with it the possibility of detention or other deprivation of liberty35 Where there is a valid confession, it is not necessary for
the complaining witness to appear at the hearing, although corroboration of
the admission may at times be desirable. As the number of juveniles represented by counsel increases in the wake of Gault, there will probably be fewer
valid admissions at intake and consequently an increasing need for the complainant to appear at the adjudicatory hearing. Under current practice, the
complainant is always present at the hearing in twenty-one Florida courts,
and only "sometimes" present in the others responding (twenty-seven).ao
When the complainant does testify, his testimony should be subject to crossexamination by the child and his counsel.
The Social Study
The use of the social study at the adjudicatory hearing involves wholesale
admission of hearsay evidence. The social study is a resum6 of the juvenile's
background, properly useful in disposition only after a finding of delinquency.
It is prepared from school, medical, church, and psychiatric records and
from informal communications with neighbors and relatives, and consequently, it contains mostly hearsay information. Seldom, if ever, are its contents taken under oath. Such social studies should be neither the basis of, nor
an influence on, the determination of delinquency when a violation of law is
alleged. "Loftiness of the motives of a juvenile court can be an insufficient
exchange for hearsay or neighborhood gossip or the inability of the child
to examine the witnesses from whom the social investigator obtained his
information."3 7 When the "child in need of supervision" status or delinquency
categories such as truancy or incorrigibility are in issue, the social study would
have relevance to the charge, because these issues concern the juvenile's
status rather than require a factual determination. However, for reliability
this information should be subject to cross-examination and presented through
sworn testimony if requested38 It has been objected that his knowledge of
some of this testimony "may make the child's treatment more difficult," but
34. Id. at 1459.

35. Although in Gault the Court did not explicitly hold that hearsay evidence could
not be used, it cast serious doubt upon its competence. Id. at 1435 n.7, 1459 n.98.
36. The questionnaire did not determine if, in those courts in which the complainant is
not always present, he is absent only because there was already a valid confession or if the
complainant is absent when the facts are at issue.
37. S. GLUEcK, THE

PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY

327 (1959), quoted in Antieau, Constitu-

tional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRNm. L.Q. 387, 403 (1961).
38. See Bochds, Juvenile Justice in California: A Reevaluation, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 47, 95
(1967).
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as Monrad Paulsen observed a decade ago: "How can he [the alleged deeffective reply to evidence unless he knows what is
linquent] make a truly
39
said and who said it?"
The hearsay of the social investigation report may influence or be the
basis of the adjudication if it is read before the validity of the allegations are
determined. Yet in eighteen courts the statements of the social study are
presented to the judge before the hearing on allegations. Another sixteen
courts read the social study in the course of the hearing and before making
an adjudication. Only eighteen of those responding consult the social study
after the adjudication of delinquency. The Gault court noted with apparent
approval the recommendation of the National Crime Commission Report:
"To minimize the danger that adjudication will be affected by inappropriate
considerations, social investigation reports should not be made known to the
judge in advance of adjudication."

'4

0

Perhaps the most effective method to protect the factfinding and adjudicatory processes from dilution by relaxed evidentiary procedures is to separate the hearing into two distinct segments, with the social study being read
only after the finding of delinquency. 41 The National Crime Commission
recommends two separate hearings, one for adjudication and one for disposition.42 Ten Florida counties now utilize this technique; nineteen have
one hearing with two separate phases, and twenty-five combine the adjudication and disposition functions in one hearing. Four counties use both two
separate hearings and a divided single hearing. One county, for example,
employs two separate hearings when the allegations are contested, and the
judge reads the social study only in the second dispositional hearing. But
when the child has signed a confession in the presence of his parents and a
court counselor, a divided single hearing is used because such a confession,
made after proper notice of rights and reaffirmed before the court, makes the
hearing essentially one for disposition. This adaptation of the Crime Commission's recommendations seems to protect the basic integrity of the factfinding and the adjudication processes, and to facilitate the work of the
court by eliminating the first separate hearing when the facts are not contested.
Because of the importance of the social study to disposition, if not properly
to adjudication, the court should offer to apprise the juvenile offender and
his family of the existence and function of the report so that the correctness
of its contents may be challenged - especially when the child and his family
are not represented by counsel who would know of such reports. However,
the social study is never made available to parties involved and their counsel
in five Florida counties, only "sometimes" in twenty-seven, and "always" in
eighteen others. Some counties routinely make the reports available to
counsel but only "rarely" to the parties involved. Access to these reports has
been guaranteed in hearings for waiver to an adult court. The recent
39. Paulsen, Fairnessto the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 560-61 (1957).
40. Gault at 1459; NATIONAL CRIME COMM'N REPORT 87.

41. See Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal,
53 VA. L. REv. 1700, 1717 (1967).
42.

NATIONAL CRIME COM1s'N RFPORT 87.
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statute provides that where waiver is based on "social histories or psychological or psychiatric reports, the child, his parents, guardian, or counsel
shall have the right to examine these reports and to question the parties re43
sponsible for them at a hearing in the juvenile court."
Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts,44 called "authoritative" in the
Gault opinion 5 suggests that when the allegations are denied or there is
reason to believe that the child may be innocent, preparation of the social
study should be delayed until after determination that the alleged act actually
happened and that the child was connected with it. This procedure avoids an
unnecessary invasion of the child's privacy if he should later be found innocent
of the allegations. The Standardsadd that the study may "result in some unwarranted discussions about the child and his family," and is only wasted
46
effort if the child is not found delinquent.
OTHER FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS

DURING

THE INTAKE, ADJUDICATION

AND

DISPOSITION PROCEEDINGS NOT DEFINED IN GAULT

In addition to the constitutional rights defined in Gault, there are other
rights equally fundamental to the requirements of due process, presently
undefined or inadequately defined by statute, and therefore left to judicial
discretion. 4 7 Responses from the juvenile courts indicate that such wide divergence exists in court practices regarding these rights that there may not be
the uniformity of justice demanded by due process and needed for equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Hearingfor Waiver to Adult Court
In Kent v. United States, 48 the Court held that when waiver to an adult
court is contemplated under local law, a hearing consistent with "due process
and fair treatment," is necessary. 49 This criterion includes right to counsel
and access to social records used by the court. Florida has adopted similar
procedures by a new statute,50 which provides for a hearing before waiver
of jurisdiction (except where the juvenile requests waiver or is indicted for
a crime punishable by death) and grants access to all social records and
psychological reports. Where waiver is discretionary, thirty-nine Florida
courts said a full hearing prior to waiver is always granted. However, seven
43. FLA. STAT. §39.02 (6) (1967). See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562-63 (1966).
44. THE CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, STANDARDS
FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS (1966) [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN'S BUREAU STANDARDS].
45. Gault at 1449-50.

46.

CHILDREN'S BUREAU STANDARDS

66.

47. For a listing of rights not extended by Gault see Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 4,
at 3-8.
48. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (based on statutory grounds).
49. Id. at 562.
50. FLA. STAT. §39.02(6) (1967). Right to counsel in a hearing on waiver has been
extended by case law based on Kent and Gault: Steinhauer v. State, 206 So. 2d 25 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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courts of smaller counties reported that the hearing is granted only "sometimes," and two small counties stated "never." Since the Kent case was decided in 1966 and the new law was filed May 22, 1967, failure to grant the
hearing clearly contravenes existing law in those cases where waiver is
discretionary.
Juvenile Records
In the last few years there has been a limited but progressive statutory
extension of the availability of juvenile records and fingerprints to noncourt
personnel. Nevertheless, public access to the records remains severely restricted to prevent stigma from attaching to the juvenile so that his prospects
for improvement and chances for success in society will not be endangered.
In 1961, traffic records of the juvenile court were excepted 1 from the general
language of Florida Statutes, section 39.12 (3), providing for the confidentiality
of records and requiring an order for access to the records by persons other
than the child, his parents, and counsel deemed to have "a proper interest
therein." The 1967 legislature expanded the statistical reporting permitted
under section 39.12 (2) to include statistics according to individual counties
by the Division of Youth Services for individual counties, 52 which had been
previously prohibited. Further, section 39.03 (6), limiting juvenile records
kept by police, was amended to allow the filing of the juvenile's fingerprints
with the Florida Sheriffs' Bureau and the court, when the juvenile is adjudicated a delinquent because of an act that would be a felony if committed
by an adult.53 In addition, by the same act it is now permissible for a judge

to open the police records of a minor over fourteen years of age "to inspection
by anyone." 54 While it is understandable in light of the increasing complexity
of society and the growing problem of juvenile delinquency that internal access for statistical and identificational purposes should be improved, it is regrettable that schools, employers, and other interested individuals may now
have access to police records of juveniles. As the National Crime Commission
observed: "experience has shown that in too many instances such knowledge
[of the juvenile's record] results in rejection or other damaging treatment of
the juvenile, increasing the chances of future delinquent acts." 55
51. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-54.
52. FLA. STAT. §39.12 (2) (1967).
53. FLA. STAT. §39.03 (6) (1967) (provides that such fingerprints, if retained, are destroyed when the juvenile attains majority).
54. Id. This liberal amendment does not extend to court records, but only to "[a]ny
record of the child made by any law enforcement officer or other person except the
officers and employees of the juvenile court . . . . Such record shall not be a public
record and shall not be open to inspection by anyone other than . . . [court officials, the
child, his parents, and counsel]; provided, however, that the records [made by noncourt
personnel] of any child over the age of fourteen (14) who is adjudicated a delinquent, may,
in the discretion of the Court, be open to inspection by anyone ..
" (emphasis added).
Jurisdiction over police records of juveniles may be a novel discovery to many juvenile
judges.
55. NATIONAL CRIME COMM'N REPORT 87; Gault made it clear that the parens patriae
theory may have a valid application in shielding the juvenile from public exposure. Gault

at 1442.
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The records of the court, on the other hand, remain restricted under
Florida Statutes, section 39.12 (3), but its restriction is widely ignored. The
section preserves the confidentiality of juvenile court records (as opposed to
records of the police and other agencies affected by section 39.08 (6), as
amended and discussed above) in the absence of a court order, except as to
the child, his parents, and counsel. While only one court responding stated
that its juvenile records were "open to all who inquire" without a court
order, four other courts allow prospective employers to inspect juvenile
records without an order. Furthermore, nineteen courts have records open
to the police, and thirty-five courts permit military authorities to have free
access.58 These practices are contrary to the spirit of the juvenile court,
which was established in part to free the child from social stigma and give
him a second chance. They are also opposed to the express statutory language
of section 39.12 (3). It is hoped that the confidentiality of the juvenile court
files will be reestablished according to statute and that the new discretionary
power to open police files "to inspection by anyone" will not often be
5 7
exercised.
PublicHearingand the Press
Prior to 1957 juvenile hearings were dosed to all but the judge, the child,
his parents or legal guardians, their attorneys, and "such other persons as
they may request or the judge may direct."58 As amended in 1957, this statute
opened the hearings to the public, except in cases involving unwed mothers,
custody and placement of illegitimate children, and proceedings dosed by the
judge's special order to protect the best interests of the child or the public. 5 9
With these exceptions in section 39.09 (2), the 1967 legislature affirmed the
right to publish proceedings in juvenile court.6 0 The survey indicated that
attitudes of the juvenile courts to the presence of members of the press vary
widely. Nine courts, all from counties with a population under 50,000, never
permit the press to attend a juvenile court hearing. -Eighteen others permit
reporters occasionally, and twenty-one always permit attendance. However,
eighteen impose some limitations on the press, usually prohibiting publication
of names of alleged offenders. Twelve courts impose no limitations whatsoever.
56. Whether juvenile records are open to the military is a discretionary matter with
the judge. [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 201. For adequate protection such disclosure should require a court order.
57. One suggestion is that there be established by statute a waivable right to public
hearing so that "star chamber" secrecy and lack of procedural protections against arbitrariness may be balanced by public exposure. The right should be waivable, rather than
by resquest only, so that there will be no adverse reflection on the judge, possible if public
trial had to be requested. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1185-86 (1966). See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in juvenile Courts, 46 Co.NELL L.Q. 387, 399 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness
to the juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 560 (1957).
58. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26880.
59. FrA. STAT. §39.09 (2) (1967).
60. FiA. STAT. §39.09 (3) (1967).
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Requisite Degree of Proof
With the traditional "civil, not criminal" characterization of juvenile
delinquency hearings came the civil burden of proof - proof by only a preponderance of the evidence when the petition's allegations are denied. 61 Other
courts, realizing the need for another test, required "sufficient competent
evidence, ' ' 62 and applied that standard even when a determination of delinquency rested on a finding of violation of a criminal statute.63 The higher
standard of "clear and convincing" proof has been advocated for use in
juvenile courts6 4 and is defined as "more than a preponderance of evidence
but less than proof beyond doubt demanded in criminal procedure . . . [and]
admits of only one reasonable conclusion." However, at least when the
delinquency petition alleges a criminal violation, the threat of long incarceration, removal from the home, and potential stigma seem to require a still
higher standard-proof beyond a reasonable doubt.65 Of Florida courts
responding to the survey, twenty-five, including three of the five largest
counties, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, twenty require "clear and
convincing" evidence, and seven ask only proof by a preponderance of evidence. A permissible exception would seem to be as suggested by one county:
when the allegations are denied, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
demanded, but when there is valid confession or a plea of guilty, only corroborative evidence is needed.

61.

Preponderance is the standard in most states. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The

Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 795 (1966).
62. E.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973
(1955). There it was said "from the very nature of the [informal] hearings in the Juvenile
Court it cannot be required that strict rules of evidence should be applied as they properly
would be in the trial of cases in the criminal court." Thus, the court hoped to "avoid
many of the legalistic features of the rules of evidence customarily applicable to other
judicial hearings."
63. E.g., State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
64. Lenert, The Juvenile Court: Quest and Realities, THE PRESIDENT'S COaNI'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND YOUTH CRIME, app. D, 91, 103 (1967); CHILDREN'S BUREAU STANDARDS 72.
65. In a recent decision, In re Urbasek, Ill. App. 2d 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967), the Illinois
Supreme Court applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test to juvenile courts, at least
when the allegation "would be criminal if charged against an adult." But see In re Wylie,
231 A.2d 81 (D.C.D.C.A. 1967), which applied the preponderance test in a post-Gault
decision. The United States Supreme Court this term has granted certiorari to a case in
which this issue is raised. In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 112 (1967). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has recently adopted proof beyond a reasonable doubt by rule 6:9-I (f)
in juvenile courts, effective Sept. 11, 1967. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 4, at 27 n.101.
See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775,
794-95 (1966); Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and
Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1193 (1966). Contra, Paulsen, Fairness to tile
Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 562-63 (1957).
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The DispositionalProcessFollowing an Adjudication of Delinquency

Once an adjudication of delinquency has been made, the disposition of
the case should, according to the philosophy of the juvenile courts, be made
in the best interest of the child.66 Inherently, this goal is incapable of precise
determination, but the responses to questions concerning disposition indicate
that views of different judges as to what children's "needs" are, the standards by which these needs are to be measured, and the available facilities to
treat these needs vary widely. In the data presented below and its analysis it is
assumed that the needs of children adjudged delinquent do not vary as much
from county to county as the wide variances in responses would suggest. Thus,
it appears there is marked inequality between counties in the methods of treatment used for the first and second delinquent acts. 67 Significantly, no substantial differences were observed that could be related to jurisdictional population, therefore indicating that differences in types of offenses found in larger or
smaller counties do not principally result in differences in treatment revealed
by the survey. Such differences, then, seem to stem more from the judges'
outlook on juvenile crime and philosophy of treatment than from generally
accepted methods of treating the child's needs. There is a need for further examination of the dispositional process and the development of authoritative
8
guidelines.
After the first and second delinquent acts, the following dispositions are
reported:

66. This traditional concept of juvenile court treatment has been criticized as not protecting the public interest in security. See Ketcham, supra note 41, at 1709-10.
67. It must be observed that the type of offense is not considered here since the "best
interests of the child" is the primary objective in disposition. No data were collected that
would indicate if such differences are substantial. The new "child in need of supervision"
status will undoubtedly change these statistics.
68. A similar suggestion has been made by the Advisory Committee of the Governor's
Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice in California in 1960. Its statement, part I,
at 12, included as the first of "several major problems which seriously impede the efficient
administration of juvenile justice in California" the "absence of well-defined, empirically
derived standards and norms to guide juvenile court judges, probation, and law enforcement
officials in their decision making. Consequently, instead of a uniform system of justice,
varied systems based upon divergent policies and value scales are in evidence. Actually,
whether or not a juvenile is arrested, placed in detention, or referred to the probation
department, and whether or not the petition is dismissed, probation is granted, or a . . .
commitment is ordered by the juvenile court, seems to depend more upon
the community in which the offense is committed than upon the intrinsic merits of the
individual case." quoted in Bochds, Juvenile Justice in California: A Reevaluation, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 47, 50 n.39 (1967). Cf. STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND

PRocEuREs (ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice) (tent. draft) (1967).
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First Act
(number of courts)

Second Act
(number of courts)

18
4
10
7
2

28
6
3
0
0

7
9
6
10
7

4
5
17
3
8

20
15
1
3
0
0

22
6
6
1
2
0

0%
1- 10%
11- 20%
21- 30%
31- 40%
41- 50%
51- 60%
61- 70%
71- 80%
81- 90%
91-100%

9
27
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3
15
7
4
3
3
0
0
1
1
0

Other Treatment

10

9

Not Responding

8

11

Warning Only
0-20%
21-40%
41-60%
61-80%
81-100%
Probation
0- 20%
21- 40%
41- 60%
61- 80%
81 -100%
Specialized Treatment
111213141%

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
and above

Commitment to a State Training
School

Several generalizations

can be drawn from the above data.

As might be

expected, there is a marked decrease in the use of a warning followed by
release when the child commits a second delinquent act. Also, while some
courts move from warning to probation on the second offense, others abandon
probation for specialized punishment, commitment to state training schools,
and other treatment (for example, detention in a local detention home).
Specialized treatment is never used by most courts reporting, but it is used
more frequently after the second act by half of those courts that do use it.
Finally, commitment to state training schools, used as a method of treatment
only infrequently after the first delinquent act, is used to a much larger extent
and by more jurisdictions after the second delinquent act. It is principally
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in this last area, the most serious since it separates the child from his family,
that the widest variance from uniformity appears. While eleven courts treat
70-100 per cent of the second offenders with mere probation, two commit
70-90 per cent of the children in the same situation to the state industrial
schools. More clearly, although three of the courts never send a child who had
committed a second delinquent act to the training schools, twelve judges send
20-90 per cent of such children to the schools and two of these send children
over 80 per cent of the time. Such marked differences in the exercise of discretion clearly point to the need of greater definitional guidelines as to when
a child becomes a "delinquent," and what is a "delinquent act." In the past
some courts have permitted multiple delinquent acts before adjudication as
a delinquent or before commitment to a state training school, while others
made the commitment "almost automatically," as one judge put it, after the
second adjudication. The following figures indicate that dispositional practices vary widely even in jurisdictions with the same population densities:
County Population
0- 9,999
10,000- 24,999
25,000- 49,999
50,000- 99,999
100,000 - 249,999
250,000 and more

Range of Frequency of Commitment to State
Training Schools After Second Delinquent Act
0- 30%
1- 80%
0-50%
1-50%
0-90%
0-40%

4
12
8
7
3
3

courts
courts
courts
courts
courts
courts

reporting
reporting
reporting
reporting
reporting
reporting

These variations within population groupings cannot reasonably be said
to reflect only the different needs of the children coming before the respective
juvenile courts, nor the differences in the types of offenses they commit as
compared with counties of the same size. Rather, such differences seem primarily the result of the presiding judge's exercise of his discretion in disposition.
Disposition is admittedly discretionary, and in the juvenile area this
judicial discretion must consider the especially subjective "best interest of
the child" test to accord with the juvenile court philosophy. But at present,
quite apart from population, it seems that disposition depends to a large
extent on the accident of jurisdiction rather than treatment providing equally
for similar needs and offenses.69

69. Lack of effective guidelines and wide judicial discretion results in nonuniform justice
to similarly situated children in different counties. This uneven justice may violate
standards of equal protection. In Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), it was
held (regarding segregated schools) that "there is no rule that counties, as counties, must
be treated alike; the Equal Protection Clause relates to equal protection of the laws 'between persons as such rather than between areas! . . . . Virginia law, as here applied,
unquestionably treats the school children of Prince Edward differently from the way it
treats the school children of all other Virginia counties [without a rational basis]." Id. at 230
(citation omitted). Similarly, children of one Florida county inay receive probation while
others in the state, presumably having the same needs, are sent to the state training school
for the same offense. Guidelines therefore need to be established for more uniform dispo-
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Secondly, widely varying means of disposing of a case are used by the
several courts, apart from dismissal, commitment to the state training school,
probation, or waiver to an adult court. Twenty-four courts reported using
specialized treatment methods connected in some way to the type of delinquent act. However, the idea of such treatment was criticized by one judge
who laconically noted: "never!" Apparently the remaining twenty-three courts
that do not use specialized punishment agree with him. Problems of equality
of treatment and perhaps at times cruel, or at least unusual, punishment may
occur when specialized punishment is used.
Nonstate agencies and other methods of disposition are used by twentytwo courts (including some of those using specialized treatment). These
agencies are used in eighteen of twenty-five counties with populations over
25,000 but in only seven of twenty-three with between 2,500 and 24,999. An
explanation for this difference may be that the larger counties have greater
access to these agencies and institutions. Among those methods of disposition mentioned were a local detention home, restitution, placement with
relatives, corporal punishment, "placed out of state to change environment,"
Job Corps, institutions or church homes, "work detail in 90% of probation,"
and boys' ranches. Besides these, the Children's Bureau suggests for all
juvenile court dispositions: "diagnostic study centers . . . small residential
treatment centers for seriously disturbed children, facilities for the care of
defective delinquents, forestry camps, foster family homes . . . (halfway
houses), and after care services ... "70
The peripheral factor of the judges' personal knowledge of treatment
facilities in the four state industrial schools was also sought. Of the forty-eight
responding, thirty-three had visited the Florida School for Boys at Marianna,
nineteen the School for Boys at Okeechobee, twenty-eight the School for Girls
at Ocala, and fifteen the School for Girls at Forest Hill. Eight juvenile
judges had never seen the facilities at any of the institutions to which they
send children for treatment. Fifteen have visited only one institution, four
only two. Twelve have visited three training schools, and nine have visited all
four. The nine largest jurisdictions had made twenty-five different institutional visits, while the nine smallest counties reported only nine visits. Visits
to the training schools on a periodic basis should be required by law so that
better informed disposition may result.
JudicialReview
Gault declined to require appellate review as part of due process, but it
did indicate that such review would prevent burdening the machinery for

sition, consistent with the child's needs for each type of offense at each stage of repetition
of delinquent conduct.
Another possible violation of equal protection - the difference between treatment the
child receives and the punishment an adult may receive for the same offense -was held by
Mr. Justice Black concurring in Gault. Gault at 1461 (Black, J., concurring).
70. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STANDARDS 84.
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habeas corpus. 71 Florida has provided for appeals from juvenile courts, 72
but the questionnaire indicated that appeals are taken very seldom. Of those
courts responding, only eight reported ever having appeals taken from them,
and only three listed appeals in the six months following the Gault decision.
When an appeal is made, it is necessary that either a record be available for
review or the judge in the original hearing must testify as to the events that
transpired. 73 In the wake of the Gault decision, appeals will undoubtedly
become more frequent, and thus the need for a complete record will increase.
Twenty-five courts reported they "always" made a record of the hearing,
eighteen "sometimes," and three "never." However, this "record" often
consists merely of a short summary or notes made by the judge or counselor.
A tape recording is used by thirteen courts, a court reporter by twenty-one
others (frequently only if counsel secures and retains the reporter), and
twenty use other methods ranging from "case papers" to "summaries of
testimony." Several courts noted that they hoped to acquire tape or disk
74
recorders in the near future.
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that from a recognition of these occasional
failures and deficiencies in Florida's generally fine juvenile courts that firmer
compliance with existing law will result to the betterment of the courts and
the youth of the state, and that stricter standards of procedure will be voluntarily adopted by the courts to insure greater precision, fairness, and reliability in delinquency determinations.
WILLIAM KNIGHT ZEWADSKI

71. Gault at 1460.
72. FLA. STAT. §39.14 (1967).
73. See Gault at 1460.
74. A verbatim recording is advocated in CHILDREN'S BuReAu STANDARDS 76.
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